



Logic Colloquium

9 November 2017, 5:00 pm – 6:30 pm

University of Konstanz, Location G 307

Proof, Meaning and Paradox: Some Remarks

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Abstract:

We discuss the extent to which proof-theoretic semantics (PTS) allows to make sense of the idea that a paradoxical sentence, though semantically defective, is nonetheless meaningful, and that it is in virtue of our understanding its meaning that we classify it as paradoxical.

We will first show that PTS provides the means to distinguish not only between paradox and mere inconsistency, but also between “paradoxicality” and other kinds of semantic defectiveness.

We will then stress the limits of the account, by drawing on an analogy between the different roles of categorical and hypothetical proofs in PTS, and the different roles of sentences and predicates in Frege’s semantic picture.